
Open Press Tilburg University
A social practice account of responsible persons
- Cheshire Calhoun(author)
- Miguel Egler(editor)
- Alfred Archer(editor)
- Jules Holroyd(contributions by)
- Heidi L. Maibom(contributions by)
- Gunnar Björnsson(contributions by)
Export Metadata
| Title | A social practice account of responsible persons |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Miguel Egler(editor) |
| Alfred Archer(editor) | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.26116/908v-q016 |
| Landing page | https://openpress.tilburguniversity.edu/projects/a-social-practice-account-of-responsible-persons |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Miguel Egler and Alfred Archer |
| Publisher | Open Press Tilburg University |
| Publication place | Tilburg, The Netherlands |
| Published on | 2024-10-12 |
| ISBN | 978-94-037-7108-3 (Paperback) |
| 978-94-037-7108-3 (PDF) | |
| 978-94-037-7108-3 (HTML) | |
| Long abstract | “The Descartes Lectures” is a biennial event at Tilburg University that invites a distinguished philosopher to deliver a series of three lectures, each followed by commentaries from other experts in the field. In 2022, Tilburg University had the honor of hosting Cheshire Calhoun for a series of talks on the important philosophical question of what it means to be a responsible person. The commentators for the lectures were Gunnar Björnsson, Jules Holroyd, and Heidi Maibom. This book is a compilation of the material of Calhoun’s lectures, the commentaries by Björnsson, Holroyd, and Maibom, as well as Calhoun’s replies to their critiques. |
| Print length | 179 pages (nulla+179+nulla) |
| Language | English (Original) |
| Dimensions | 170 x 240 mm | 6.692913385826772" x 9.448818897637796" (Paperback) |
| OCLC Number | 1493646325 |
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| Keywords |
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| Funding |
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Contents
- Miguel Egler
- Alfred Archer
Contributors
Cheshire Calhoun
(author)professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University
Miguel Egler
(editor)Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University
Alfred Archer
(editor)Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University
Jules Holroyd
(contributions by)Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at University of Sheffield
Heidi L. Maibom
(contributions by)Professor of Philosophy at University of Cincinnati
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at University of the Basque Country
Gunnar Björnsson
(contributions by)Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University
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