- Presumptive Limitarianism: A Reply to Robert Huseby
- Dick Timmer(author)
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| Title |
|
|---|---|
| Contributor | Dick Timmer(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0338.08 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0338/chapters/10.11647/obp.0338.08 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Dick Timmer |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Publication place | Cambridge, UK |
| Published on | 2023-07-06 |
| Long abstract | In earlier work on limitarianism, I argued that setting an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have is justified when decision-makers are unaware of or disagree about the appropriate distributive criterion or if they are unaware of people’s relevant features (or both). Robert Huseby has raised several powerful objections to this presumptive argument for limitarianism. Some of these objections call for a revision of my defence of presumptive limitarianism while others call for clarification, both of which I aim to do in this chapter. I will argue that unless decision-makers have substantive reasons to suggest otherwise, they must act as if there is an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have. |
| Page range | pp. 203–218 |
| Print length | 16 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Contributors
Dick Timmer
(author)Dick Timmer is an Assistant Professor at TU Dortmund University. He works in political philosophy and ethics, with a particular focus on distributive justice. His work has been published in journals such as Journal of Applied Philosophy, Economics and Philosophy, Journal of Political Philosophy, Philosophy Compass, and Utilitas.
References
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- Hickey, Colin. 2023. Sufficiency, Limits, and Multi-Threshold Views. In: Ingrid Robeyns (Ed.). Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, pp. 219–246.
- Huseby, Robert. 2022. The Limits of Limitarianism. Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(2), 230–248. https://doi.org//10.1111/jopp.12274(opens in new tab)
- Räikkä, Juha. 2019. On the Presumption of Equality. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 22(7), 809–822. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438335(opens in new tab)
- Robeyns, Ingrid. 2017. Having Too Much. In: Jack Knight and Melissa Schwartzberg (Eds). NOMOS LVI: Wealth. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. New York: New York University Press, pp. 1–44.
- Robeyns, Ingrid. 2022. Why Limitarianism? Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(2), 249–270. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12275(opens in new tab)
- Sunstein, Cass R. 1995. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. Harvard Law Review, 108(7), 1733–1772. https://doi.org/10.2307/1341816(opens in new tab)
- Timmer, Dick. 2021a. Limitarianism: Pattern, Principle, or Presumption? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 38(5), 760–773. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12502(opens in new tab)
- Timmer, Dick. 2021b. Thresholds and Limits in Theories of Distributive Justice. Utrecht: Utrecht University. https://doi.org/10.33540/570(opens in new tab)
- Valentini, Laura. 2012. Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: a conceptual map. Philosophy Compass, 7(9), 654–664. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00500.x(opens in new tab)
