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11. The Self-Respect Argument for Limitarianism

  • Christian Neuhäuser(author)
Chapter of: Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism(pp. 271–296)
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Title11. The Self-Respect Argument for Limitarianism
ContributorChristian Neuhäuser(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0338.11
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0338/chapters/10.11647/obp.0338.11
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
CopyrightChristian Neuhäuser
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Published on2023-07-06
Long abstract

Limitarianism is the view that justice requires the limitation of wealth, at least under certain conditions. In its original form the view was developed by Ingrid Robeyns and normatively justified by the use of two arguments, the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs. In this chapter I want to contribute to the justification of limitarianism by providing a novel argument for limitarianism which is distinct from the two arguments developed by Robeyns. This argument is based on self-respect as a primary basic good. According to this argument, limitarianism is needed to protect the social basis of self-respect of all members of society so that they can develop a sense of self-worth and pursue their personal projects. Since this kind of self-respect is a more important basic good than wealth above a certain threshold, limitarianism can be justified either as a principle of justice or as a direct policy implication of the principles of justice, if it turns out to be required to secure the social basis of self-respect.

Page rangepp. 271–296
Print length26 pages
LanguageEnglish (Original)
Locations
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HTMLhttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0338/chapters/10.11647/obp.0338.11Landing pagehttps://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0338/ch11.xhtmlFull text URLPublisher Website
Contributors

Christian Neuhäuser

(author)
Professor of Political Philosophy at TU Dortmund University
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3439-6088

Christian Neuhäuser is Professor of Political Philosophy at TU Dortmund University. His research focuses on theories of dignity, theories of responsibility, philosophy of economics and philosophy of international relations. He is a member of the Green Academy and editor of The Journal for Business, Economics & Ethics. He studied Philosophy, Sinology and Sociology in Göttingen, Berlin and Hong Kong and received his Ph.D. from the University of Potsdam with a thesis on “Corporations as Moral Actors”. He has published in Review of Social Economy, Philosophy Compass, Moral Philosophy and Politics, and Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, among other places.

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