- The Permissible and the Forbidden
- Michael Richter(author)
- Ariel Rubinstein(author)
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| Title |
|
|---|---|
| Contributor | Michael Richter(author) |
| Ariel Rubinstein(author) | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0404.02 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0404/chapters/10.11647/obp.0404.02 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Publication place | Cambridge, UK |
| Published on | 2024-04-24 |
| Long abstract | Following Richter and Rubinstein (2020), we analyze an equilibrium concept based upon social norms: the Y-equilibrium. A Y-equilibrium is a set of permissible alternatives and a profile of choices, one for each agent, such that: (i) each agent's choice is optimal from among the permissible alternatives; (ii) the profile of choices is feasible; and (iii) the set of permissible alternatives is maximal in the sense that there is no superset of permissible alternatives from which a profile satisfying (i) and (ii) can be found. By this definition, two forces make a permissible set unstable: The first modifies the permissible set in the case that the profile of (intended) choices is not feasible, while the second loosens restrictions on the permissible set as long as a new profile of optimal choices is feasible. We also consider a variant of this concept where we require that the permissible set is convex. We study the Y-equilibria of a variety of examples and prove existence theorems, “welfare” theorems and a structure theorem when the set of alternatives is Euclidean. |
| Page range | pp. 37–64 |
| Print length | 28 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
