- Regime change
- Martin J. Osborne(author)
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| Title |
|
|---|---|
| Contributor | Martin J. Osborne(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0490.15 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0490/chapters/10.11647/obp.0490.15 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Martin J. Osborne |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Publication place | Cambridge, UK |
| Published on | 2025-09-12 |
| Long abstract | Suppose that initially the distribution of wealth is controlled by the rich members of a society. In some periods, the environment is favorable to a successful revolt by the poor. Such a revolt destroys some wealth and makes the remainder permanently available to the poor. If an environment favorable to revolt is rare, the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the rich hand control of the distribution of wealth permanently to the poor (they "democratize") when an environment favorable to revolt occurs. In a model in which the poor members of society need to coordinate for a revolt to succeed, there is an equilibrium in which they coordinate perfectly if they observe the dictator's action, but not if they do not observe that action. |
| Page range | pp. 453–482 |
| Print length | 30 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
