Open Book Publishers
- Collective choice with privately-known preferences
- Martin J. Osborne(author)
Chapter of: Models in Political Economy: Collective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion(pp. 71–88)
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| Title |
|
|---|---|
| Contributor | Martin J. Osborne(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0490.02 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0490/chapters/10.11647/obp.0490.02 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Martin J. Osborne |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Publication place | Cambridge, UK |
| Published on | 2025-09-12 |
| Long abstract | For collective choice problems in which each individual's preferences are known only to her, does there exist a mechanism for selecting an alternative that varies reasonably with the individuals' preferences? If every preference profile that is regarded as possible has a Condorcet winner, the answer is positive, but otherwise the answer is generally negative. |
| Page range | pp. 71–88 |
| Print length | 18 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Contributors
Martin J. Osborne
(author)Professor Emeritus of Economics at University of Toronto
