Independent Candidates and Electoral Reform in South Africa: Striking a Balance between Sections 18 and 19 of the Constitution: New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa
- Roxan Laubscher(author)
- Marius van Staden(author)
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| Title | Independent Candidates and Electoral Reform in South Africa: Striking a Balance between Sections 18 and 19 of the Constitution |
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| Subtitle | New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.64449/9781997468912-10 |
| Landing page | https://ujonlinepress.uj.ac.za/index.php/ujp/catalog/view/420/1411/6458 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| Copyright | Roxan Laubscher, Marius Van Staden |
| Publisher | UJ Press |
| Publication place | Johannesburg |
| Published on | 2025-12-31 |
| Short abstract | The South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard case represents a key moment in South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional jurisprudence on affirmative action. This landmark judgment addresses the complex tension between individual rights and the broader societal objective of transformation |
| Long abstract | The South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard case represents a key moment in South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional jurisprudence on affirmative action. This landmark judgment addresses the complex tension between individual rights and the broader societal objective of transformation. The Constitutional Court established what would become known as the “Barnard principle”, which permits employers to deny appointments that would negatively impact representivity, even to candidates who scored highest in selection processes. The court articulated a nuanced approach to evaluating affirmative action measures, emphasising that while such measures are integral to achieving substantive equality, their implementation must be rationally connected to their purpose. The case established the minimum standard of rationality for assessing implementation decisions but revealed significant judicial disagreement on whether more stringent standards of fairness or proportionality should apply. This judicial divergence reflects broader societal debates about how to balance competing constitutional imperatives of equality, dignity and transformation. The subsequent Solidarity case extended the “Barnard principle” to all designated groups, clarifying that it applies not only to white candidates but also to African, coloured and Indian persons and both genders. This expansion demonstrates the principle’s far-reaching implications for employment equity implementation across all demographic categories. The Barnard judgment’s significance lies in its recognition that restitutionary measures are not exceptions to equality but form part of substantive equality itself, while simultaneously acknowledging the importance of human dignity and reasoned decision-making in their implementation. By establishing a framework for evaluating affirmative action measures that balances transformation with individual rights, the case provides crucial guidance for navigating one of the most challenging aspects of South Africa’s constitutional democracy: redressing historical injustices while building a non-racial, non-sexist society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom. |
| Page range | pp. 241–267 |
| Print length | 28 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
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