| Title | Interests |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Brian Weatherson(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0425.02 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0425/chapters/10.11647/obp.0425.02 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Brian Weatherson |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Published on | 2024-11-21 |
| Long abstract | This chapter sets out the primary argument that knowledge is interest-relative. It describes a simple kind of game, and argues that orthodox philosophical approaches to knowledge are committed to judging clearly irrational ways to play the game to be rational. It also sets out more carefully just what the interest-relative view is, and what the orthodox view it seeks to overturn is, as well as describe two other alternatives (to both interest-relativity and orthodoxy) that should be considered. |
| Page range | pp. 25–54 |
| Print length | 30 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.