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Knowledge: A Human Interest Story

Metadata
TitleKnowledge
SubtitleA Human Interest Story
ContributorBrian Weatherson(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0425
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/OBP.0425
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
CopyrightBrian Weatherson
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Publication placeCambridge, UK
Published on2024-11-21
ISBN978-1-80511-394-2 (Paperback)
978-1-80511-395-9 (Hardback)
978-1-80511-396-6 (PDF)
978-1-80511-398-0 (HTML)
978-1-80511-397-3 (EPUB)
Short abstractIn this book the author argues for a groundbreaking perspective that knowledge is inherently interest-relative. This means that what one knows is influenced not just by belief, evidence, and truth, but crucially by the purposes those beliefs serve. Drawing from classical Nyāya epistemologies, the book asserts that knowledge rationalizes action: if you know something, it is sensible to act on it—and the best way to square this with an anti-sceptical epistemology is to say that knowledge is interest-relative.
Long abstractIn this book the author argues for a groundbreaking perspective that knowledge is inherently interest-relative. This means that what one knows is influenced not just by belief, evidence, and truth, but crucially by the purposes those beliefs serve. Drawing from classical Nyāya epistemologies, the book asserts that knowledge rationalizes action: if you know something, it is sensible to act on it—and the best way to square this with an anti-sceptical epistemology is to say that knowledge is interest-relative. While versions of this view have been debated, they haven’t gained wide acceptance. The author addresses common objections with a refined formulation and explores how this perspective elucidates the role of knowledge in inquiry, daily life, and the history of thought. Key distinctions include the impact of “long odds” situations on knowledge, the distinctive role knowledge has a starting point for inquiry, and the importance of using non-ideal models in theorising about knowledge. Building on decades of scholarship, the author offers a cohesive theory that integrates and clarifies previous works, demonstrating that not only knowledge but also belief, rational belief, and evidence are interest-relative. This book is essential for those seeking a deeper understanding of the intricate relationship between knowledge and practical interests.
Print length284 pages (viii+276)
LanguageEnglish (Original)
Dimensions156 x 16 x 234 mm | 6.14" x 0.63" x 9.21" (Paperback)
156 x 18 x 234 mm | 6.14" x 0.71" x 9.21" (Hardback)
Weight406g | 14.32oz (Paperback)
580g | 20.46oz (Hardback)
Media16 tables
OCLC Number551282237
LCCN2023513473
THEMA
  • QDTK
  • JBCC9
  • QDTL
BISAC
  • PHI004000
  • PHI009000
  • PHI000000
  • PHI011000
LCC
  • BD183
Keywords
  • Interest-Relative Epistemology
  • Nyāya Epistemology
  • Rational Action
  • Knowledge and Belief
  • Inquiry and Reasoning
  • High-Stakes Scenarios
Contents

Preface

(pp. 1–6)
  • Brian Weatherson

1. Overture

(pp. 7–24)
  • Brian Weatherson

2. Interests

(pp. 25–54)
  • Brian Weatherson

3. Belief

(pp. 55–88)
  • Brian Weatherson

4. Knowledge

(pp. 89–124)
  • Brian Weatherson

5. Inquiry

(pp. 125–152)
  • Brian Weatherson

6. Ties

(pp. 153–178)
  • Brian Weatherson

7. Changes

(pp. 179–194)
  • Brian Weatherson

8. Rationality

(pp. 195–216)
  • Brian Weatherson

9. Evidence

(pp. 217–246)
  • Brian Weatherson

10. Power

(pp. 247–252)
  • Brian Weatherson
Locations
PaperbackLanding pageFull text URLPublisher Website
HardbackLanding pageFull text URLPublisher Website
PDFLanding pageFull text URLPublisher Website
Landing pageFull text URLOAPEN
Landing pageDOAB
Landing pageFull text URL
Landing pageFull text URL
Landing pageFull text URLINTERNET ARCHIVE
HTMLLanding pageFull text URLPublisher Website
EPUBLanding pageFull text URLPublisher Website
Contributors

Brian Weatherson

(author)
Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0830-141X
https://brian.weatherson.org/

Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.

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