| Title | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Brian Weatherson(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0425.09 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0425/chapters/10.11647/obp.0425.09 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Brian Weatherson |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Published on | 2024-11-21 |
| Long abstract | This chapter sets out my interest-relative theory of evidence. I argue that one’s evidence just is what a radical interpreter would say one’s evidence is. But, I go on to argue, in some cases that means we end up playing a kind of coordination game with the radical interpreter. What our evidence is turns on what the right solution to that game. And the solution is interest-relative, but not in the way that knowledge is, nor in the way that rational belief is. |
| Page range | pp. 217–246 |
| Print length | 30 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.