| Title | Rationality |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Brian Weatherson(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0425.08 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0425/chapters/10.11647/obp.0425.08 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Brian Weatherson |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Published on | 2024-11-21 |
| Long abstract | This chapter goes over my theory of rational belief. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the view defended by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, interests affect rational belief in a very different way to how they effect knowledge. On my view, but not theirs, someone who has mistaken, and irrational, beliefs about what practical situation they are facing can easily have a rational, true belief that is not knowledge. |
| Page range | pp. 195–216 |
| Print length | 22 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.