| Title | Belief |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Brian Weatherson(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0425.03 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0425/chapters/10.11647/obp.0425.03 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Brian Weatherson |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Published on | 2024-11-21 |
| Long abstract | This chapter argues that belief is interest-relative for the following reason. A big part of what it is to believe that p is to be willing to use p as a starting point in inquiries. But for most people, for most of their beliefs, there will be some inquiry where they won’t start with that belief. For example, the inquiry into whether they might have made a mistake in forming that very belief. There is a tension here, and the best way to resolve it is to say that when they are going about ordinary life, they have the belief, but they lose it when they turn to more unusual inquiries about their own reliability. |
| Page range | pp. 55–88 |
| Print length | 34 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.