| Title | Knowledge |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Brian Weatherson(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0425.04 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0425/chapters/10.11647/obp.0425.04 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Brian Weatherson |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Published on | 2024-11-21 |
| Long abstract | This chapter sets out how the moves from the previous two chapters combine to generate a constraint on any plausible theory of knowledge. A person has knowledge that p only if it makes sense to use p as a starting point into what they are actually inquiring into. A central focus of this chapter is how this constraint meshes with the idea that we can extend our knowledge by logical deduction. |
| Page range | pp. 89–124 |
| Print length | 36 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.