Open Book Publishers
Models in Microeconomic Theory: Expanded Second Edition (She)
2nd Edition
- Martin J. Osborne(author)
- Ariel Rubinstein(author)
Export Metadata
- ONIX 3.0
- Thoth
- Project MUSE
- OAPEN
- JSTOR
- Google Books
- OverDriveCannot generate record: No priced EPUB or PDF URL
- ONIX 2.1
- CSV
- JSON
- OCLC KBART
- BibTeX
- CrossRef DOI deposit
- MARC 21 Record
- MARC 21 Markup
- MARC 21 XML
| Title | Models in Microeconomic Theory |
|---|---|
| Subtitle | Expanded Second Edition (She) |
| Contributor | Martin J. Osborne(author) |
| Ariel Rubinstein(author) | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0361 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/OBP.0361 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Martin J. Osborne; Ariel Rubinstein |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Publication place | Cambridge, UK |
| Published on | 2023-06-26 |
| ISBN | 978-1-80511-121-4 (Paperback) |
| 978-1-80511-122-1 (Hardback) | |
| 978-1-80511-123-8 (PDF) | |
| Short abstract | Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. |
| Long abstract | Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels. |
| Print length | 379 pages (xvii+362) |
| Language | English (Original) |
| Dimensions | 203 x 26 x 254 mm | 7.99" x 1.02" x 10" (Paperback) |
| 203 x 31 x 254 mm | 7.99" x 1.22" x 10" (Hardback) | |
| Weight | 1013g | 35.73oz (Paperback) |
| 1263g | 44.55oz (Hardback) | |
| OCLC Number | 1150169822 |
| LCCN | 2022361505 |
| THEMA |
|
| BIC |
|
| BISAC |
|
| LCC |
|
| Keywords |
|
Contents
Preferences and utility
(pp. 3–16)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Choice
(pp. 17–30)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Preferences under uncertainty
(pp. 31–44)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Consumer preferences
(pp. 45–56)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Consumer behavior
(pp. 57–74)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Producer behavior
(pp. 75–88)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Monopoly
(pp. 89–102)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
A jungle
(pp. 105–120)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
A market
(pp. 121–136)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
An exchange economy
(pp. 137–156)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Variants of an exchange economy
(pp. 157–174)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
A market with consumers and producers
(pp. 175–186)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Equilibrium with prices and expectations
(pp. 187–202)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
A market with asymmetric information
(pp. 203–214)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Strategic games
(pp. 217–256)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Extensive games
(pp. 257–294)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Mechanism design
(pp. 297–304)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Matching
(pp. 305–316)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Socialism
(pp. 317–328)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Aggregating preferences
(pp. 329–346)- Martin J. Osborne
- Ariel Rubinstein
Contributors
Martin J. Osborne
(author)Professor Emeritus of Economics at University of Toronto
Ariel Rubinstein
(author)Emeritus in School of Economics at Tel Aviv University
Professor of Economics at New York University