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6. Los límites del limitarismo

Chapter of: Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo(pp. 171–196)

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Metadata
Title6. Los límites del limitarismo
ContributorRobert Huseby(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0354.06
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0354/chapters/10.11647/obp.0354.06
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
CopyrightRobert Huseby
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Published on2024-02-19
Long abstractEste capítulo comienza examinando el limitarismo instrumental de Robeyns y argumenta que esta perspectiva no es limitarista como tal, ya que los valores intrínsecos que promueve son defendidos de mejor manera por otros principios instrumentales. Después, se argumenta que es difícil imaginar una versión convincente del limitarismo intrínseco. Esto se debe a que, primero, las posibles versiones del limitarismo intrínseco sugeridas (aunque no respaldadas) por Robeyns realmente descansan sobre otros valores, lo cual relega al limitarismo al ámbito instrumental. Segundo, una versión del limitarismo basada directamente en la (supuesta) maldad de tener demasiado no es convincente. Subsecuentemente, las perspectivas instrumentales (aparte de la de Robeyns) son revisitadas; sin embargo, también se consideran deficientes. Finalmente, el intento de defender una “presunción limitarista” más limitada es evaluado y rechazado.
Page rangepp. 171–196
Print length26 pages
LanguageSpanish (Translated_into)
Contributors

Robert Huseby

(author)
Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Oslo
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3252-8059

Robert Huseby is professor in the Department of Political Science, at the University of Oslo. He specializes in political theory, and is in particular interested in distributive justice, democratic theory, and climate ethics. His research has appeared in journals such as Utilitas, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, Journal of Social and Ethical Philosophy, Journal of Political Philosophy, Political Research Quarterly, and World Politics.

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