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10. Un argumento neorrepublicano a favor del limitarismo

  • Elena Icardi (author)
Chapter of: Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo(pp. 277–302)

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Metadata
Title10. Un argumento neorrepublicano a favor del limitarismo
ContributorElena Icardi (author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0354.10
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0354/chapters/10.11647/obp.0354.10
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
CopyrightElena Icardi
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Published on2024-02-19
Long abstractEn este capítulo, argumento que el limitarismo debería ser defendido dentro del neorrepublicanismo. Esto se debe a que el ideal neorrepublicano de la libertad como no-dominación se ve amenazado por la presencia de los superricos en una democracia. Al poseer muchos más recursos que sus conciudadanos, los superricos disfrutan de un poder político desproporcionado, con lo cual dominan el proceso democrático. Asimismo, las restricciones institucionales formales en lo que respecta a esto sólo funcionan hasta cierto punto limitado. En aras de la no-dominación, por lo tanto, la riqueza individual excesiva debería ser limitada. Argumento que esto puede realizarse mediante un umbral limitarista. Sin embargo, tal umbral debería fijarse allí donde surge el problema mismo. Es decir, no debería limitar la riqueza que las personas no necesitan para florecer plenamente. Más bien, debería limitar la riqueza que permite a las personas dominar la toma pública de decisiones incluso cuando existen barreras formales para evitarlo. Por lo tanto, ofrezco un argumento novedoso a favor del limitarismo desde la perspectiva neorrepublicana.
Page rangepp. 277–302
Print length26 pages
LanguageSpanish (Translated_into)
Contributors

Elena Icardi

(author)
PhD in Political Studies from the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP) at University of Milan

Elena Icardi holds a PhD in Political Studies from the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP) of the University of Milan (Political Theory curriculum). She wrote a dissertation on contemporary republicanism and distributive justice. Her research interests mostly focus on Neo-republicanism, Rousseau’s political thought, freedom as non-domination, equality, and democratic participation. She has recently published an article (in Italian) in Biblioteca della libertà on “Why limit excessive individual wealth? Reasons and problems of limitarianism”.

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