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8. Limitarismo presuntivo: Una respuesta a Robert Huseby

Chapter of: Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo(pp. 227–244)

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Metadata
Title8. Limitarismo presuntivo
SubtitleUna respuesta a Robert Huseby
ContributorDick Timmer(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0354.08
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0354/chapters/10.11647/obp.0354.08
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
CopyrightDick Timmer
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Published on2024-02-19
Long abstractEn un trabajo previo sobre el limitarismo, argumenté que establecer un límite superior a la cantidad de riqueza que la gente puede tener permisiblemente está justificado cuando los responsables de la toma de decisiones desconocen o discrepan sobre el criterio distributivo apropiado o si desconocen las características relevantes de las personas (o ambos). Robert Huseby ha planteado varias objeciones poderosas en contra de este argumento presuntivo a favor del limitarismo. Algunas de estas objeciones exigen que mi defensa del limitarismo presuntivo sea revisada, mientras que otras exigen que se clarifique, lo cual pretendo hacer en este capítulo. Argumentaré que, a menos que los responsables de la toma de decisiones tengan razones sustantivas que sugieran lo contrario, deben actuar como si hubiera un límite superior a la cantidad de riqueza que la gente puede tener permisiblemente.
Page rangepp. 227–244
Print length18 pages
LanguageSpanish (Translated_into)
Contributors

Dick Timmer

(author)
Assistant Professor at TU Dortmund University
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0337-3369

Dick Timmer is an Assistant Professor at TU Dortmund University. He works in political philosophy and ethics, with a particular focus on distributive justice. His work has been published in journals such as Journal of Applied Philosophy, Economics and Philosophy, Journal of Political Philosophy, Philosophy Compass, and Utilitas.

References
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  2. Hickey, Colin. 2023. Sufficiency, Limits, and Multi-Threshold Views. In: Ingrid Robeyns (Ed.). Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, pp. 219–46.
  3. Huseby, Robert. 2022. The Limits of Limitarianism. Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(2), 230–48. https://doi.org//10.1111/jopp.12274
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  5. Robeyns, Ingrid. 2017. Having Too Much. In: Jack Knight and Melissa Schwartzberg (Eds.). NOMOS LVI: Wealth. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. New York: New York University Press, pp. 1–44.
  6. Robeyns, Ingrid. 2022. Why Limitarianism? Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(2), 249–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12275
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  8. Timmer, Dick. 2021a. Limitarianism: Pattern, Principle, or Presumption? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 38(5), 760–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12502
  9. Timmer, Dick. 2021b. Thresholds and Limits in Theories of Distributive Justice. Utrecht: Utrecht University. https://doi.org/10.33540/570
  10. Valentini, Laura. 2012. Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: a conceptual map. Philosophy Compass, 7(9), 654–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00500.x