- Limitarismo presuntivo: Una respuesta a Robert Huseby
- Dick Timmer(author)
Export Metadata
| Title |
|
|---|---|
| Subtitle | Una respuesta a Robert Huseby |
| Contributor | Dick Timmer(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0354.08 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0354/chapters/10.11647/obp.0354.08 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Dick Timmer |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Publication place | Cambridge, UK |
| Published on | 2024-02-19 |
| Long abstract | En un trabajo previo sobre el limitarismo, argumenté que establecer un límite superior a la cantidad de riqueza que la gente puede tener permisiblemente está justificado cuando los responsables de la toma de decisiones desconocen o discrepan sobre el criterio distributivo apropiado o si desconocen las características relevantes de las personas (o ambos). Robert Huseby ha planteado varias objeciones poderosas en contra de este argumento presuntivo a favor del limitarismo. Algunas de estas objeciones exigen que mi defensa del limitarismo presuntivo sea revisada, mientras que otras exigen que se clarifique, lo cual pretendo hacer en este capítulo. Argumentaré que, a menos que los responsables de la toma de decisiones tengan razones sustantivas que sugieran lo contrario, deben actuar como si hubiera un límite superior a la cantidad de riqueza que la gente puede tener permisiblemente. |
| Page range | pp. 227–244 |
| Print length | 18 pages |
| Language | Spanish (Translated into) |
Contributors
Dick Timmer
(author)Dick Timmer is an Assistant Professor at TU Dortmund University. He works in political philosophy and ethics, with a particular focus on distributive justice. His work has been published in journals such as Journal of Applied Philosophy, Economics and Philosophy, Journal of Political Philosophy, Philosophy Compass, and Utilitas.
References
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