Skip to main content
Open Book Publishers

9. Suficiencia, límites y perspectivas de umbrales múltiples

Chapter of: Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo(pp. 245–276)

Export Metadata

  • ONIX 3.0
    • Thoth
    • Project MUSE
      Cannot generate record: No BIC or BISAC subject code
    • OAPEN
    • JSTOR
      Cannot generate record: No BISAC subject code
    • Google Books
      Cannot generate record: No BIC, BISAC or LCC subject code
    • OverDrive
      Cannot generate record: No priced EPUB or PDF URL
  • ONIX 2.1
  • CSV
  • JSON
  • OCLC KBART
  • BibTeX
  • CrossRef DOI deposit
    Cannot generate record: This work does not have any ISBNs
  • MARC 21 Record
    Cannot generate record: MARC records are not available for chapters
  • MARC 21 Markup
    Cannot generate record: MARC records are not available for chapters
  • MARC 21 XML
    Cannot generate record: MARC records are not available for chapters
Metadata
Title9. Suficiencia, límites y perspectivas de umbrales múltiples
ContributorColin Hickey(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0354.09
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0354/chapters/10.11647/obp.0354.09
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
CopyrightColin Hickey
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Published on2024-02-19
Long abstractEn este capítulo, intervengo en un conjunto de debates en la literatura sobre la justicia distributiva para evaluar la relación entre el suficientarismo y el limitarismo. En particular, investigo si los suficientaristas tendrían que (o incluso deben) respaldar una tesis limitarista; similarmente, también investigo si los limitaristas tendrían que (o incluso deben) respaldar una tesis suficientarista. Argumento que los suficientaristas sí tienen muy buenas razones para también adoptar una tesis limitarista, así como los limitaristas para adoptar una tesis suficientarista. Aunque considero algunos argumentos especulativos sobre una conexión conceptual necesaria entre ambas perspectivas, los resultados son más tentativos. Así que, aunque en principio es posible sostener una perspectiva sin sostener la otra, hacerlo es difícil de justificar y no es aconsejable. Concluyo el capítulo sugiriendo algunas razones por las que debería resultarnos menos sorprendente de lo que podríamos pensar el que nuestras teorías más plausibles de la justicia distributiva resulten ser perspectivas “de umbrales múltiples” de cierta estructura, que contengan (al menos) un umbral suficientarista y uno limitarista.
Page rangepp. 245–276
Print length32 pages
LanguageSpanish (Translated_into)
Contributors

Colin Hickey

(author)
Assistant Professor in the Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics at University of Amsterdam
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2275-8130

Colin Hickey is an Assistant Professor at the University of Amsterdam, in the Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics. Previously, he was a postdoctoral research associate at Princeton University in the University Center for Human Values and the High Meadows Environmental Institute, and before that he was a postdoctoral researcher at Utrecht University with the Fair Limits Project. He received his PhD in philosophy from Georgetown University. His work focuses on moral and political philosophy, especially issues of climate justice and responsibility.

References
  1. Axelsen, David and Lasse Nielsen. 2015. Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress, Journal of Political Philosophy, 23 (4), 406–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12048
  2. Barry, Brian. 1989. Theories of Justice. Hemel-Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
  3. Benbaji, Yitzak. 2005. The Doctrine of Sufficiency: A Defence, Utilitas, 17(3), 310–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820805001676
  4. Benbaji, Yitzak. 2006. Sufficiency or Priority? European Journal of Philosophy, 14(3), 327–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00228.x
  5. Carey, Brian. 2020. Provisional Sufficientarianism: Distributive Feasibility in Non‐ideal Theory, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 54, 589–606. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09732-7
  6. Casal, Paula. 2007. Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, Ethics, 117, 296–326. https://doi.org/10.1086/510692
  7. Casal, Paula. 2016. “Por qué la suficiencia no basta.” En Igualitarismo: una discusión necesaria, editado por Javier Gallego S. y Thomas Bullemore L., traducido por Javier Gallego Saade, 263–95. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Públicos.
  8. Christiano, Thomas. 2012. Money in Politics. In: David Estlund (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 241–57.
  9. Crisp, Roger. 2003a. Equality, Priority, and Compassion, Ethics, 113(4), 745–63. https://doi.org/10.1086/373954
  10. Crisp, Roger. 2003b. Egalitarianism and Compassion, Ethics, 114(1), 119–26. https://doi.org/10.1086/377088
  11. Frankfurt, Harry. 1987. Equality as a Moral Ideal, Ethics, 98, 21–43.
  12. Frankfurt, Harry. 2006. “La igualdad como ideal moral”. En La importancia de lo que nos preocupa: Ensayos filosóficos, traducido por Verónica Inés Weinstahl y Servanda María de Hagen, 195–228. Buenos Aires: Katz.
  13. Gough, Ian. 2017. Recomposing Consumption: Defining Necessities for Sustainable and Equitable Well-being, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 375 (Issue 2095): 20160379. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0379
  14. Hickey, Colin. 2021. Climate Change, Distributive Justice, and “Pre-Institutional” Limits on Resource Appropriation, European Journal of Philosophy, 29(1), 215–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12569
  15. Hope, Simon. 2010. The Circumstances of Justice, Hume Studies, 36(2), 125–48. http://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2010.0015
  16. Hume, David. 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature (Ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton). New York: Oxford University Press.
  17. Hume, David. 1998. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Ed. Tom L. Beauchamp). New York: Oxford University Press.
  18. Huseby, Robert. 2010. Sufficiency: Restated and Defended, The Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2), 178–97. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00338.x
  19. Huseby, Robert. 2020. Sufficiency and the Threshold Question, The Journal of Ethics, 24, 207–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-020-09321-7
  20. Huseby, Robert. 2022. The Limits of Limitarianism, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(2), 230–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12274
  21. Millward-Hopkins, Joel. 2022. Inequality can double the energy required to secure universal decent living, Nature Communications, 13, 5028. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-32729-8
  22. Nielsen, Lasse. 2019. Sufficiency and Satiable Values, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 36(5), 800–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12364
  23. Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
  24. O’Neill, Daniel, et al. 2018. A good life for all within planetary boundaries. Nature Sustainability, 1, 88–95. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0021-4
  25. Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  26. Rawls, John. 2012. Teoría de la justicia. Traducido por María Dolores González. Distrito Federal: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
  27. Raworth, Kate. 2017. Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. London: Random House.
  28. Robeyns, Ingrid. 2017. Having Too Much. In: J. Knight & M. Schwartzberg (Eds.). NOMOS LVI: Wealth. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. New York: New York University Press, pp. 1–44.
  29. Robeyns, Ingrid. 2019. What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Extreme Wealth? Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 20 (3), 251–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2019.1633734
  30. Robeyns, Ingrid. 2022. Why Limitarianism? The Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(2), 249–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12275
  31. Shields, Liam. 2012. The Prospects for Sufficientarianism, Utilitas, 14, 101–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820811000392
  32. Shields, Liam. 2016. Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
  33. Tebble, A. J. 2020. On the Circumstances of Justice, European Journal of Political Theory, 19(1), 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885116664191
  34. Temkin, Larry. 2003. Egalitarianism Defended, Ethics, 113(4), 764–82. https://doi.org/10.1086/373955
  35. Timmer, Dick. 2021a. Limitarianism: Pattern, Principle, or Presumption? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 38(5), 760–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12502
  36. Timmer, Dick. 2021b. Thresholds in Distributive Justice, Utilitas, 33(4), 422–41. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000194
  37. Timmer, Dick. 2022. Justice, Thresholds, and the Three Claims of Sufficientarianism, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 30(3), 298–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12258
  38. Vanderschraaf, Peter. 2006. The Circumstances of Justice. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 5(3), 321–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X06068303
  39. Volacu, Alexandru and Adelin Dumitru. 2019. Assessing Non-intrinsic Limitarianism, Philosophia, 47, 249–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9966-9
  40. Wiedmann, Thomas, et al. 2020. Scientists’ warning on affluence, Nature Communications, 11, 3107. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16941-y
  41. Zwarthoed, Danielle. 2018. Autonomy-Based Reasons for Limitarianism, Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 21, 1181–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9958-7