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7. ¿Por qué el limitarismo?

Chapter of: Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo(pp. 197–226)

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Metadata
Title7. ¿Por qué el limitarismo?
ContributorIngrid Robeyns(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0354.07
Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0354/chapters/10.11647/obp.0354.07
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
CopyrightIngrid Robeyns
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Published on2024-02-19
Long abstractEste capítulo responde a la crítica de Robert Huseby de que el limitarismo instrumental no es genuinamente limitarista. Primero, introduzco la distinción entre la filosofía orientada-a-los-problemas frente a la orientada-a-la-teoría, la cual es relevante para evaluar mi trabajo previo sobre el limitarismo. Después, replanteo y refino el limitarismo con base en desarrollos recientes en la literatura. Después argumento que el limitarismo es distinto del igualitarismo, así como del suficientarismo. El limitarismo encaja bien como una parte de una concepción pluralista de la justicia distributiva. Concluyo argumentando que el limitarismo podría desempeñar un papel distintivo tanto en la filosofía política como en la sociedad.
Page rangepp. 197–226
Print length30 pages
LanguageSpanish (Translated_into)
Contributors

Ingrid Robeyns

(author)
Chair in Ethics of Institutions at Utrecht University
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2893-1814

Ingrid Robeyns holds the chair in Ethics of Institutions at Utrecht University. She received her PhD dissertation from Cambridge University in 2003 and has since been publishing widely on questions of distributive justice, inequalities, applied ethics, and methodological considerations. She served as the first Director of the Dutch Research School of Philosophy, as the former director of Utrecht University’s Ethics Institute, and as the eighth president of the Human Development and Capability Association. She has co-edited two edited volumes and three special journal issues, and has previously published the book Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice (2017, https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0130) with Open Book Publishers. She currently has a contract with Allen Lane (UK) and Astra House (USA) for a trade book on limitarianism (with translation rights sold to seven other publishers), which is scheduled to appear in the winter of 2023–2024.

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