6. Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology
- Jeroen Hopster(author)
- Philip Brey(author)
- Michael Klenk(author)
- Guido Löhr(author)
- Samuela Marchiori(author)
- Björn Lundgren(author)
- Kevin Scharp(author)
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Title | 6. Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology |
---|---|
Contributor | Jeroen Hopster(author) |
Philip Brey(author) | |
Michael Klenk(author) | |
Guido Löhr(author) | |
Samuela Marchiori(author) | |
Björn Lundgren(author) | |
Kevin Scharp(author) | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0366.06 |
Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0366/chapters/10.11647/obp.0366.06 |
License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
Copyright | Jeroen Hopster et al. |
Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
Published on | 2023-09-05 |
Long abstract | This chapter provides a theoretical lens on conceptual disruption. It offers a typology of conceptual disruption, discusses its relation to conceptual engineering, and sketches a programmatic view of the implications of conceptual disruption for the ethics of technology. We begin by distinguishing between three different kinds of conceptual disruptions: conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments. Subsequently, we distinguish between different mechanisms of conceptual disruption, and two modes of conceptual change. We point out that disruptions may be induced by technology, but can also be triggered by intercultural exchanges. Conceptual disruptions frequently yield conceptual uncertainty and may call for conceptual and ethical inquiry. We argue that a useful approach to address conceptual disruptions is to engage in conceptual engineering. We outline what conceptual engineering involves and argue that discussions on conceptual disruption and conceptual engineering can benefit from closer integration. In closing, we discuss the relevance of studying conceptual disruption for technology ethics, and point to the promise of this line of research to innovate practical philosophy at large. |
Page range | pp. 141–162 |
Print length | 22 pages |
Language | English (Original) |
Jeroen Hopster
(author)Jeroen Hopster is an Assistant Professor of Ethics at Utrecht University. His research centers on climate ethics and on investigating the nature of socially disruptive technologies. ORCID: 0000-0001-9239-3048
Philip Brey
(author)Philip Brey is a Professor in philosophy and ethics of technology at the University of Twente and leader of the ESDiT programme. His research is in general ethics of technology, in which he investigates new approaches for ethical assessment, guidance and design of emerging technologies, and in ethics of digital technologies, with a focus on AI, robotics, internet, virtual reality and the metaverse. ORCID: 0000-0002-4789-4588.
Michael Klenk
(author)Michael Klenk is an Assistant Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Technology at TU Delft. He works on the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology, most recently on the topic of (online) manipulation. ORCID: 0000-0002-1483-0799
Guido Löhr
(author)Guido Löhr is an Assistant Professor of Logic and AI at Vrije University Amsterdam. They work on various topics in philosophy of language, social ontology and philosophy of technology with a focus on concepts. ORCID: 0000-0002-7028-3515
Samuela Marchiori
(author)Samuela Marchiori is a PhD candidate in Conceptual Engineering in the Philosophy of Technology at TU Delft. She is developing methods to address and overcome the disruption of moral concepts in relation to socially disruptive technologies. ORCID: 0000-0002-6426-7690
Björn Lundgren
(author)Björn Lundgren is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Utrecht University. He is working on methods of ethics of technology. ORCID: 0000-0001-5830-3432
Kevin Scharp
(author)Kevin Scharp is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Twente. He has published widely on the topic of Conceptual Engineering. ORCID: 0000-0003-3900-4087
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