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Aristotle with a Twist

Chapter of: Speculative Medievalisms: Discography(pp. 227–253)

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Metadata
TitleAristotle with a Twist
ContributorGraham Harman(author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.21983/P3.0021.1.21
Landing pagehttps://punctumbooks.com/titles/speculative-medievalisms/
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
CopyrightHarman, Graham
Publisherpunctum books
Published on2013-01-17
Long abstractIn several publications, I have made the case for objects as the central theme of philosophy.1 It might seem paradoxical that Heidegger is cited as a key inspiration for this proposal, since “object” is almost never a positive term in Heidegger’s philos-ophy, where it refers to the one-sided objectification of things, reduced to presence-at-hand for consciousness or manipula-ble stockpiles of material for the enframing work of technolo-gy. In the later Heidegger we find the word “thing,” a more positive term for the individual entity as it mirrors the four-fold play of earth, sky, gods, and mortals.2 Additional alter-nate terms might be considered: Bruno Latour prefers to speak of “actors” or “actants.”3 Ian Bogost employs the term “units,”4 with a Latin etymology whose Greek equivalent “monads” in Leibniz is another candidate term.5 There is also the more traditional word “substance,” which I have some-times used myself, less for shock value than to show the classi-cal roots of the theme of object-oriented philosophy. Though all terminology is somewhat arbitrary, it should not be chosen carelessly. While it is tempting to coin neologisms in order to avoid being confused for someone else, it is often possible to retain traditional terms while cleanly removing their now ir-relevant connotations. The reason I prefer the term “object” is simply because of its roots in the tradition of phenomenology. Husserl tells us openly in the Logical Investigations that expe-rience is made of “object-giving acts,” and Heidegger’s “thing” is an attempt to modify and amplify the famous Husserlian battle cry “to the things themselves.”6 When speaking of “ob-jects” in what follows I refer notonlyto objects as something objectified in consciousness (though these certainly exist, and must be accounted for), but also to objects as described in Heidegger’s tool-analysis, incommensurable with any form of presence before the mind.
Page rangepp. 227–253
Print length27 pages
LanguageEnglish (Original)