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The Self

  • William James (author)
Chapter of: Social Media & the Self: An Open Reader

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Metadata
TitleThe Self
ContributorWilliam James (author)
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.32376/3f8575cb.8ccffaec
Landing pagehttps://www.mediastudies.press/pub/james-self/
Licensehttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
Publishermediastudies.press
Published on2021-07-15
Short abstractThe Me and the I.—Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal existence.
Long abstractThe Me and the I.—Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal existence. At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total self of me, being as it were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject, must have two aspects discriminated in it, of which for shortness we may call one the Me and the other the I. I call these “discriminated aspects,” and not separate things, because the identity of I with me, even in the very act of their discrimination, is perhaps the most ineradicable dictum of common-sense, and must not be undermined by our terminology here at the outset, whatever we may come to think of its validity at our inquiry’s end. I shall therefore treat successively of (A) the self as known, or the me, the ‘empirical ego’ as it is sometimes called; and of (B) the self as knower, or the I, the ‘pure ego’ of certain authors.