Namelessness and the Speculative Turn: A Response to Whistler

I appreciate the engagement of my work that Daniel Whistler has provided. I do not think his read-ing is ultimately accurate, but that is to the side, because its point of approach allows me to develop a number of ideas that are central not only to the interpretation of Spinoza and the problematic of religious language (or the naming of the divine), but also—even moreso—to the future of thought in general after the speculative turn. In what follows I will argue, first, that Whistler fails to appreciate the way the concept of namelessness functions in my theoretical construction of Spinzoa’s thought. I will then address the various difficulties raised by Whistler’s own account of identity, before proceeding to consider how my disagreement with Whistler runs right to the heart of arguments about the nature of the speculative turn. Indeed, my contention is that namelessness, as I articulate its immanent relation with the act of naming, is resonant with an essential tendency in the work of philosophers such as Eugene Thacker and Ray Brassier. Finally, I will look at how the concept of namelessness serves to indicate and oppose a still-effective Christian hegemony over philosophy.