| Title | Inquiry |
|---|---|
| Contributor | Brian Weatherson(author) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0425.05 |
| Landing page | https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0425/chapters/10.11647/obp.0425.05 |
| License | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
| Copyright | Brian Weatherson |
| Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
| Published on | 2024-11-21 |
| Long abstract | On the theory of this book, if something is known, it is available to use as a starting point in inquiry. It is natural to move from that view to the view that it is irrational to inquire into what one already knows. But recent work on inquiry shows that this isn’t right; depending on what one wants to do in an inquiry one may want to deliberately set aside some things one knows. And that might mean inquiry into what one already knows, what we ordinarily call double-checking, is reasonable. This fact is used to respond to an influential objection by Jessica Brown to the style of argument I use in chapter 2. |
| Page range | pp. 125–152 |
| Print length | 28 pages |
| Language | English (Original) |
Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His previous books are Normative Externalism (OUP, 2019), and A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013 (Michigan Publishing, 2022). Brian has over 80 journal articles and book chapters; information about them is at https://brian.weatherson.org/.